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Is Entrepreneurship Missing 
in Shanghai?
Yasheng Huang and Yi Qian
Economists and other scholars studying transition economies disagree with 
one another about the economic and political merits of mass privatization, 
ﬁ  nancial reforms, and foreign trade reforms. Few, however, dispute the vital 
importance of fostering the development of new, entrepreneurial businesses. 
Entrepreneurial businesses—deﬁ  ned as new entrants and as privately-
 owned—create jobs and promote growth at a time when state- owned enter-
prises (SOEs) are being downsized and retrenched. The economic contribu-
tions of new, entrepreneurial businesses in a transitional context exceed not 
only those of SOEs but also those of newly-  privatized ﬁ  rms.
It has been estimated that the vast majority of new jobs in transition econ-
omies were created in the emerging private sector. McMillan and Woodruﬀ 
(2002) provide detailed data. During the ﬁ  rst seven years of reforms in Viet-
nam, net job creation by the new private sector was ten million, whereas job 
creation in the state sector was negative. In Romania and Slovakia, a higher 
proportion of new private ﬁ  rms created jobs than either SOEs or privatized 
ﬁ  rms. In addition, the new private ﬁ  rms grew faster and invested at a higher 
rate (although the evidence here is not uniform). McMillan and Woodruﬀ 
also report studies showing a positive correlation between general economic 
growth and entrepreneurial entry.
Yasheng Huang is a professor of political economy and international management at the 
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Yi Qian is an assistant 
professor of Marketing and Kraft Research Professor at the Kellogg School of Management, 
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Research.
We thank Randall Morck and the participants at the NBER conference on international 
diﬀerences in entrepreneurship for their comments. We are grateful to S. P. Kothari, Joshua 
Lerner, and Antoinette Schoar for their detailed comments on an early draft of this chapter. 
We also thank Harrison Shih for RA work. The usual caveats apply.322    Yasheng Huang and Yi Qian
In this respect, it is particularly interesting and—as we would argue, ana-
lytically important—to note that a city widely regarded as a huge economic 
success in China, Shanghai, has an unexpectedly low level of entrepreneur-
ship, deﬁ  ned here as de novo private businesses. China as a whole is not 
short of entrepreneurship. It is well- known that township and village enter-
prises (TVEs) powered the Chinese economic growth in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. (What is less well-  known, however, is that the vast majority of 
the TVEs were completely private from the very beginning of the reforms.1) 
Relative to the rest of the country, the level of entrepreneurship in Shanghai 
is conspicuously low. This ﬁ  nding is robust to a variety of speciﬁ  cations—
to detailed industry and ﬁ  rm-  level controls and to alternative deﬁ  nitions of 
private ﬁ  rms.
This phenomenon of missing entrepreneurship in Shanghai raises a num-
ber of questions. During the period of our data set (1998 to 2001), Shanghai 
grew rapidly. Its real gross domestic product (GDP) growth was in excess of 
10 percent annually. During this period, Shanghai also attracted an enor-
mous amount of foreign direct investment (FDI). (In 2004, FDI inﬂ  ows 
amounted to six billion dollars, equivalent to the entire FDI inﬂ  ows to India 
during the same period.) That entrepreneurship was lagging at a time when 
GDP growth was fast in the richest region of China calls into question the 
mechanism of growth in Shanghai, as well as why the beneﬁ  ts of this growth 
did not accrue to the indigenous entrepreneurs in Shanghai. We oﬀer some 
conjectures in the concluding section.
There is also an analytical issue. There are not many prima facie reasons 
why entrepreneurship should be missing in Shanghai. We will elaborate on 
this point more fully in section 10.1 of the chapter. Suﬃce it to say here that 
the phenomenon of a low level of entrepreneurship in Shanghai is particu-
larly intriguing given our primary measure of entrepreneurship. Here, we 
measure entrepreneurship primarily by the density of private businesses—
the number of private businesses per population—and we supplement the 
measurement with an alternative proxy—the average number of employees 
per entrepreneurial business. Our priors are that Shanghai should have per-
formed very well by these measures of entrepreneurship.
In the 1990s Shanghai experienced a massive restructuring of SOEs. Total 
employment in the city declined. In 1995, the broadest measure of employ-
ment stood at 7.9 million; in 2000 it was 6.7 million, a reduction of 15 per-
cent (mainly due to the restructuring of the state sector). At the same time, 
Shanghai had one of the highest unemployment rates in the country. This 
1. Based on detailed archival research of Chinese documents going back to the early 1980s, 
Huang (2008) ﬁ  nds that the Chinese deﬁ  nition of TVEs refers to their geographic location—that 
is, their rural location. However, Western academics assume that TVEs refer to their owner-
ship—that is, by townships and villages. In 1985, of the 12 million TVEs in China, 10 million 
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is the important macro context against which our regression results should 
be understood.
Shanghai should have performed very well by our measures of entrepre-
neurship absent any policy barriers. Because of the high and rising unem-
ployment, there should have been ample incentives to go into entrepreneur-
ship (e.g., self-  employment). Studies of entrepreneurship examine whether 
self- employment is really a disguised form of unemployment. The trade- oﬀs 
between self- employment and other employment in Shanghai were not sub-
stantial during the period in question. Also, to the extent that policy played 
a role, it is interesting to note that Shanghai had a low density of private 
business even at a time when the SOEs were shedding jobs on a large scale.
Much of the economics literature on how government aﬀects entrepre-
neurship focuses on the role of regulation. This focus has led to a prolifera-
tion of studies on and development of measures of “ease of doing business.” 
In this chapter, we propose that government aﬀects entrepreneurship not 
only by regulations but also by economic policies. Governments in develop-
ing countries seldom stand aside and let market determine resource ﬂ  ows 
among the various economic sectors. Rather, industrial policy intervenes to 
privilege certain industries to the detriment of others.
Among local governments in China, Shanghai is known as having a par-
ticularly strong industrial policy. Our hypothesis about the phenomenon 
of missing entrepreneurship in Shanghai suggests that it was the industrial 
policy in Shanghai that suppressed its entrepreneurship. We provide narra-
tive and descriptive evidence of this industrial policy in Shanghai (although, 
due to data limitations, we are still unable to explicitly link industrial policy 
with the entrepreneurial measure in our main data set).
An industrial policy model may be anti-  entrepreneurial in several ways. 
One is that it may favor incumbent businesses because incumbent busi-
nesses are large. This is the familiar national championship rationale. A 
second anti-  entrepreneurial bias embodied in industrial policy is a techno-
cratic mechanism. An emphasis on technology may prompt government to 
privilege one type of investment—foreign direct investment (FDI), often 
associated with high-  tech—at the expense of indigenous small, low-  tech 
entrepreneurs.
A third prominent characteristic associated with industrial policy is entry 
restrictions and government targeting of ﬁ  rms. Would-  be entrepreneurial 
businesses are often viewed as competitors in terms of taking precious 
resources such as bank credits and, critically in the case of Shanghai, land. 
Although economists have studied the eﬀects of industrial policy on com-
petition and corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1997), our study probes the 
potentially detrimental eﬀects of industrial policy on entrepreneurship.
Our main empirical ﬁ  ndings are generated by our unique data set. This 
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Statistics (NBS). (We will provide additional details about this data set in 
section 10.1 of the chapter.) Our data set is the most detailed data set on 
ﬁ  rm activities in China. It is an annual census covering 1998, 1999, 2000, 
and 2001, including all industrial ﬁ  rms—regardless of ownership type—
with sales value above ﬁ  ve million yuan in these four years. The advantage, 
compared with other survey data supplied to Western researchers that does 
not disclose details about sampling procedures (or with sampling procedures 
that may contain known or unknown biases), is that our data set is compre-
hensive. Another advantage is that because our data set contains informa-
tion on ﬁ  rms of all ownership types, we can benchmark entrepreneurial 
ﬁ  rms against incumbent ﬁ  rms (such as SOEs). In contrast, very few surveys 
cover ﬁ  rms of all ownership types.
To be sure, there are also some disadvantages with our data set. One is 
that the CIC covers ﬁ  rms, rather than entrepreneurs. Due to this limitation, 
we cannot go into detail about why or how the entrepreneurs in our data set 
became entrepreneurs. We leave this question to other scholars who have 
looked into this issue (see, for example, Djankov et al. [2006]). We hope 
that factors such as motivation, education, and gender—personal attributes 
deemed relevant to entrepreneurial activity in the academic literature—do 
not systematically vary between Shanghai and other regions of China.
The second limitation of the CIC is that it only covers industrial ﬁ  rms. 
This raises the issue of whether Shanghai, as the most urban economy in 
China, may have larger service-  sector entrepreneurial ﬁ  rms. This bias is 
not too severe, however, for two reasons. One is that we are benchmarking 
Shanghai against other cities. The vast majority of ﬁ  rms in excess of ﬁ  ve mil-
lion yuan in sales are urban ﬁ  rms and, to the extent we can, we try to control 
for factors such as rural migration. Second, unlike metropolitan economies 
in the developed countries, Shanghai has not entered the postindustrial age. 
As of 2001, in terms of employment, industry still accounted for 55 percent 
of the total, so it was still larger than the service sector. The results reported 
in this chapter do not diﬀer qualitatively from the results reported in a pre-
vious version of this chapter, which used a private-  sector survey conducted 
in 2002 that did include service-  sector ﬁ  rms.2
The other disadvantage of the CIC is that it has a cutoﬀ threshold of ﬁ  ve 
million yuan in annual sales. This means that the CIC is biased toward larger 
industrial establishments. The issue here is whether these larger industrial 
establishments can still be considered “entrepreneurial.” We answer in the 
aﬃrmative. One reason is the recent vintage of these ﬁ  rms—almost all the 
private ﬁ  rms in the CIC were created in the 1990s. The other reason is that 
an important criterion of the quality of a business environment is whether 
it facilitates the growth of entrepreneurial businesses. It is thus meaningful 
2. The 2002 private-  sector survey shows that, after controlling for a variety of industry and 
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to ascertain if the entrepreneurial businesses located in the richest and the 
fastest-  growing regional economy in China, céteris paribus, can grow. In 
our empirical tests, we benchmark the size of entrepreneurial businesses 
against the size of incumbent businesses such as SOEs. This is to illustrate 
the relative size diﬀerentials between entrepreneurial businesses and non-
entrepreneurial businesses in Shanghai and other regions of China.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.1 is a detailed empiri-
cal illustration of the missing-  entrepreneurship phenomenon in Shanghai. 
Section 10.2 oﬀers a hypothesis as to why entrepreneurship is missing in 
Shanghai. The hypothesis focuses on the suppressive role of industrial pol-
icy. Section 10.3 concludes with some remarks on the broader implications 
of our ﬁ  ndings.
10.1      The Missing Entrepreneurship in Shanghai: 
An Empirical Investigation
One reason why the phenomenon of missing entrepreneurship in Shang-
hai is interesting is that it contrasts sharply with the conventional wisdom in 
the West—that Shanghai is a dynamic economy. Another is that Shanghai 
has a number of locational and other advantages that should be propitious 
to the development of entrepreneurship. In this section we illustrate some 
of these factors. We then explain our data and our measures.
10.1.1      Some Basic Facts about Shanghai
Shanghai is located in the southeastern region of China.3 It is a coastal 
city, with a total area of 6,300 square kilometers. According to the 2000 
population census, it had a population of around 16.7 million. Shanghai is 
an economic center of China. With a population of only 1.3 percent and a 
land area of 0.1 percent of the national totals, its GDP is about 5.4 percent 
of the national total and 6.9 percent of the total national industrial output 
value. It is the richest region in China.
To underscore an earlier point, industry continues to power Shanghai’s 
economy. Shanghai is the country’s biggest producer of a number of prod-
ucts, such as chemical ﬁ  bers, ethylene, cars, program-  controlled exchanges, 
power-  generating equipment, and personal computers. From 2000 to 2004, 
Shanghai’s heavy industry grew at an annual rate of 24.9 percent and its light 
industry grew at 10.4 percent. Our data set thus oﬀers valuable insights about 
the city even though it is limited to industrial ﬁ  rms.
Our priors are that Shanghai should have been abundantly endowed with 
entrepreneurship if the policy environment had been accommodating. For 
one thing, history is on its side. Shanghai has a long history of entrepre-
3. Some of these ﬁ  gures are taken from the website of the Shanghai government, at 
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neurship. In the ﬁ  rst three decades of the twentieth century, Shanghai was a 
major business and ﬁ  nancial hub of Asia. It was the home of the country’s 
largest textile ﬁ  rms and banks. It was also the founding venue of a number 
of ﬁ  rms that are still major multinational corporations (MNCs) in the world 
today, such as Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and 
American Insurance Group (AIG).
A very powerful illustration of Shanghai’s rich entrepreneurial heritage 
is the near-  absolute dominance of the Hong Kong economy by industrial-
ists who left Shanghai in 1949.4 During Hong Kong’s take-  oﬀ period, its 
most important industry was textiles. As recently as 1977, the textile indus-
try produced 47 percent of Hong Kong’s export value and employed 45 
percent of its workforce. In the late 1970s, Shanghai industrialists owned 
twenty- ﬁ  ve—out of a total of thirty—of the cotton- spinning mills in Hong 
Kong. Shanghai industrialists also created twenty out of the twenty-  one 
cotton-  spinning mills established between 1947 and 1959. It is not an exag-
geration to say that the Hong Kong miracle was a Shanghai miracle in dis-
guise. Thus, it is surprising that contemporary Shanghai should be so short 
of entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurial businesses in Shanghai also have some substantial loca-
tional advantages. Because it is one of the most important economic centers 
of China, agglomeration economics should favor its entrepreneurs. There 
are substantial business opportunities. Measured in terms of per capita 
GDP, Shanghai is the richest economy in China. It has the highest GDP 
per capita in the country; in 2005, its GDP per capita was about ﬁ  ve times 
the national average. In the 1990s, annual GDP growth averaged above 11 
percent in real terms.
Some scholars have argued that entrepreneurship is rooted and embedded 
in culture. According to Kirzner (1979), entrepreneurs are those who are 
particularly alert to business opportunities that often elude others. Saxenian 
(1994) attributes the diﬀerence between Route 128 and Silicon Valley to the 
latter’s more freewheeling culture. Although this is highly anecdotal, the 
“folk wisdom” in China is that people in Shanghai satisfy one particular 
deﬁ  nition of entrepreneurs very well; that is, Shanghainese are reputed to be 
well- endowed with business acumen. Shanghai also has other advantages. It 
has a rich endowment of human capital, as the home to a number of the best 
educational institutions in the country (such as Fudan and Jiaotong).
The economics literature stresses the importance of institutions in ex-
plaining economic growth. In particular, institutions protecting private prop-
erty rights and enforcing contracts are of ﬁ  rst-  order importance (North 
1991; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). New ﬁ  rm growth in transi-
tional economies is shown to be highly sensitive to the security of property 
4. For a good account of the role of Shanghai industrialists in Hong Kong, see Wong 
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rights (Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ 2000). Economists also stress 
ﬁ  nancing constraints as important to the investment decisions of private 
ﬁ  rms (Levine 1997).
However, these theories may not readily apply to Shanghai, at least not 
in their original formulations. China does not have well-  developed legal 
and ﬁ  nancial institutions but it is not clear why Shanghai is substantially 
underdeveloped as compared with other regions of China. The conventional 
wisdom is just the opposite. China scholars believe that Shanghai has the 
most developed legal system in China and many Western legal academics 
have used Shanghai as a case study to illustrate the progress China has 
made in terms of rule of law (Guthrie 1999). Transitional economists have 
also shown that there are a variety of “self-  help” coping mechanisms that 
entrepreneurs have devised to ameliorate the shortcomings of formal institu-
tions. For example, entrepreneurs only do businesses with people whom they 
know and they rely on supplier or customer credit to obviate a dependency 
on banks (McMillan and Woodruﬀ 1999a, 1999b). Thus, even if formal 
institutions in Shanghai are found to be lacking, a deeper and more relevant 
question is why these informal self- help coping mechanisms have also failed 
to work in Shanghai.
10.1.2      Data: Chinese Industry Census (CIC)
Our empirical investigation is based on the CIC compiled by the NBS in 
China. The CIC is, to our knowledge, the most detailed database on Chinese 
industrial ﬁ  rms. It covers the entire population of Chinese companies with 
sales above ﬁ  ve million yuan for each census year from 1998 to 2001. The 
ﬁ  rms covered by the CIC account for a huge portion of the Chinese econ-
omy. One estimate by Geng (2006) is that the CIC ﬁ  rms account for between 
33 to 43 percent of industrial output value and between 14 to 19 percent of 
GDP. Other researchers who have used this data set have uncovered impor-
tant dynamics about the Chinese economy (Dougherty and Herd 2005).
The data set contains detailed information about each company’s iden-
tity, address, industry classiﬁ  cation, incorporation year, total employment, 
annual wage payments and fringe beneﬁ  ts, the hierarchical level to which 
the company answers (regional, provincial, town-  level, etc.), and registra-
tion type (such as SOE, private ﬁ  rm, foreign-  invested enterprises [FIE]). 
The data set also lists the three main products in the order of their rela-
tive importance to the ﬁ  rm and the production capacities for these three 
products, respectively. Furthermore, the data set contains detailed balance 
sheet information (such as assets, debts, and shareholder equity), as well as 
information on sales, proﬁ  ts, and exports. There are detailed records of the 
breakdowns of equity capital by domestic and foreign sources (and foreign 
investments are further broken down between ethnically Chinese investors 
and foreign investors).
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entrepreneurial businesses per city normalized by population and average 
ﬁ  rm employment. However, these measures may be inﬂ  uenced by conven-
tional business dynamics such as technology, the extent of competition in 
the industry, or the capital intensity of the industry. The diﬃculty is to 
distinguish the eﬀects of the policy environment—which is our suggested 
hypothesis for why entrepreneurship is missing in Shanghai—from the 
industry eﬀects. One may argue, for example, that Shanghai’s industry mix 
is the reason why the city has fewer entrepreneurial businesses or why their 
size tends to be small, as compared to the national average.
We tackle this challenge in two ways. First, we have detailed industry con-
trols in all our regression analyses. One of the most signiﬁ  cant advantages 
of the CIC is that it contains detailed industry breakdowns. The Chinese 
standard of industrial classiﬁ  cation (CSIC), modiﬁ  ed in 1988, was adapted 
from the International Standard of Industrial Classiﬁ  cation (ISIC). The 
CSIC in our data set is at the four- digit level, detailed to the level of product 
groupings, such as leather shoes, as opposed to just shoes. Such ﬁ  ne industry 
classiﬁ  cations allow us to control for technological and other dynamics at 
the near product level. Our industry controls, as far as we know, are one of 
the most detailed and precise among this type of studies (Hall, Jaﬀe, and 
Tratjenberg 2001; Khan and Qian 2009). The panel structure further helps 
to eliminate any time-  invariant industry-  speciﬁ  c eﬀects.
Our second method is to use the registration information provided in the 
CIC. We show that entrepreneurial businesses in Shanghai are underdevel-
oped both absolutely and relatively. They are smaller or fewer as compared 
with those in other cities and they are smaller or fewer relative to nonentre-
preneurial businesses such as SOEs in other cities. Because the CIC contains 
information on the ownership types of ﬁ  rms, we are able to benchmark 
private ﬁ  rms against SOEs.
A widely-  accepted deﬁ  nition of entrepreneurship is that it is a start-  up 
business. The private-  sector ﬁ  rms in the CIC satisfy this condition. The 
absolute majority of the ﬁ  rms classiﬁ  ed as privately-  owned in the 1998 to 
2001 CIC were established in the 1990s. The average number of years of 
operation is 5.3 for the Shanghai sample and 9.7 for the entire China sample 
in the 2000 CIC. Thus, a typical entrepreneurial business in Shanghai was 
founded in 1995. (In our regression analysis, we will control for the age of 
the ﬁ  rms.)
The vast majority of the private-  sector ﬁ  rms were not privatized SOEs. 
They are thus the only category of ﬁ  rms in China that are without substan-
tial ties to the government. Even many FIEs are joint ventures with SOEs 
that have ties to the government. In addition, they are very small, with a 
median employment of 134 persons in the national sample. This is far below 
the conventional 500-  person cutoﬀ threshold for large ﬁ  rms used by the 
World Bank (Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone 2003).
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with the state-  owned incumbent ﬁ  rms, the private-  sector ﬁ  rms are very 
nimble, and completely proﬁ  t-  driven and market-  driven. This attribute is 
emphasized by scholars such as Frank Knight (1921) and Israel Kirzner 
(1979). The ﬁ  rms unleash what Schumpeter called “creative destruction” 
by oﬀering new products and services and by injecting competition to chal-
lenge incumbents (Schumpeter 1976). Our concept of entrepreneurship is 
entirely consistent with previous research on entrepreneurship in transition 
economies (McMillan and Woodruﬀ 2002).
In all likelihood, the vast majority of the entrepreneurial ﬁ  rms in our data 
set are still run by their original founders, thus satisfying another condi-
tion for these ﬁ  rms to be classiﬁ  ed as entrepreneurial. None of the private-
 sector  ﬁ  rms in our data set is listed on Chinese stock markets and they all 
have a very concentrated ownership structure. Our data set does not contain 
detailed information on the founders, but in a 2002 survey of private- sector 
ﬁ  rms that are very similar to the private-  sector ﬁ  rms in our data set, the 
average number of shareholders is only 5.6 persons and the median number 
of shareholders is only two. The largest number of shareholders is ﬁ  fty-  four. 
So unlike managers in SOEs and MNCs, the managers in these private-
 sector  ﬁ  rms bear signiﬁ  cant residual risks and beneﬁ  ts of ownership.
10.1.3    Variables
We rely on two primary measures of the development of entrepreneurship 
and we benchmark Shanghai against other cities in China based on these 
two measures. The two measures are the number of private businesses per 
city and the employment size of a private business. Both of these measures 
closely follow the standard treatments in the economics literature. Firm 
number is often used as an indicator of business development (Spulber 
2009). This is a measure of business density. We derive this measure of busi-
ness density in two ways. One is the ratio of the number of entrepreneurial 
businesses to the urban population. The other is a more explicit measure of 
entrepreneurial business density, which is the ratio of the number of entre-
preneurial businesses to the number of incumbent businesses—deﬁ  ned as 
state-  owned enterprises (SOEs) in this chapter. (We have also carried out a 
regression analysis based on the log value of the number of entrepreneurial 
businesses. The qualitatively similar results are not shown in this chapter.)
An alternative measure is the log value of employment size per ﬁ  rm. 
There is a long tradition in the economics literature of using employment 
size as a measure of business development (Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales 
1999; Cabral and Mata 2003). We use these two measures in part to be 
consistent with prior economic studies but also because these are especially 
relevant to Shanghai. Private businesses create jobs, and in the context of a 
transition economy they are the only source of job creation. The ability of 
entrepreneurial businesses to generate employment at a time when the SOEs 
are shedding jobs entails enormous welfare implications. For this reason, 330    Yasheng Huang and Yi Qian
economists studying entrepreneurial dynamics in transition economies fo-
cus on employment (Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruﬀ 2000).
The employment measure is particularly pertinent to Shanghai. In the 
1990s, as its economy grew rapidly, Shanghai lost a large number of jobs. In 
1995, aggregate employment stood at 7.9 million; by 2000 it was 6.7 million, 
a reduction of 15 percent. Since 2000, however, there has been a recovery 
in the creation of employment. Only in 2004 did aggregate employment in 
Shanghai recover to its 1995 level of 8.1 million. The growth of joblessness 
in Shanghai highlights the important role of policy. Later in this chapter, 
we propose that Shanghai was an industrial policy state maximizing techno-
logical objectives and growth of big ﬁ  rms. This policy orientation was detri-
mental to employment generation as well as to small-  scale entrepreneurial 
businesses. We hypothesize that it is this feature of Shanghai that depressed 
entrepreneurial development in the city.
In all our regression analyses, we include industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects and a set 
of provincial characteristics. In some of the regression runs, we also control 
for a set of ﬁ  rm- level characteristics. The ﬁ  rm- level controls refer to the age 
of the ﬁ  rms (used to proxy for the experience accumulated by the ﬁ  rm), the 
level of their debt (measured by debt to asset ratios), and the level of the 
political hierarchy of the ﬁ  rms. The former two controls are common in 
economic studies and the latter is speciﬁ  c to China. In China, ﬁ  rms of all 
ownership types are assigned to a particular level of the political hierarchy 
for management purposes or for data reporting. We control for this dynamic 
in our analysis. Industry controls refer to the four-  digit CSIC to proxy for 
technology, capital intensity, and other industry characteristics.
In our regression analyses, we benchmark Shanghai against other Chinese 
cities. We use the ﬁ  ve-  digit regional codes in the CIC to generate 360 city 
dummies. (The ﬁ  ve- digit regional code is at the county level and we aggregate 
the ﬁ  ve-  digit county codes to three-  digit city codes.) We present our results 
in two ways. One is to benchmark Shanghai against all other cities (or the 
national average) in the data set; the other is to show city-  by-  city results. In 
the latter case, because of the large number of cities, we will only present 
the summary results. (We have also carried our regression analyses bench-
marking Shanghai against other provinces. As a provincial- level city Shang-
hai is often treated as a province rather than as a city. The provincial-  level 
analysis—not shown in this chapter—yields qualitatively similar results to 
those reported here based on the city-  level analysis.5)
Because our regressions have city dummies, we cannot control for their 
economic characteristics. Instead, we control for a set of economic char-
acteristics at the provincial level. There are thirty provinces in China that 
vary enormously in terms of their levels of economic development, trade 
5. The results are available from the authors upon request.Is Entrepreneurship Missing in Shanghai?    3 3 1
openness, and level of rural migration. In all our regression runs, we include 
the log value of the per capita GDP of all the provinces (GDP per capita) 
and trade to GDP ratio (“Trade openness”). We use their values as of 1995 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2005).
It can be argued that rural migration may aﬀect entrepreneurial develop-
ment in Shanghai or our measures of entrepreneurial development.6 There 
are two concerns here. One is that the CIC only covers those ﬁ  rms formally 
registered with the government. To the extent that rural—and unregis-
tered—migrants also operate businesses, our measure will omit them. A 
related concern is that Shanghai, because of its aging population, has been 
particularly open to rural migration. If this is the case, according to this 
hypothesis, our results will have a downward bias for Shanghai.
A logical implication of the hypothesis is that Shanghai has a larger 
informal economy. In fact, there is no evidence that this is so. In 2004, the 
Chinese government conducted a comprehensive economic census of all 
business in the country, both registered and unregistered. The most com-
mon unregistered businesses are what are known in China as household 
businesses—mom-  and-  pop single proprietorships. According to the 2004 
economic census, Shanghai has the lowest ratio of unregistered to total 
household businesses in the country, at around 16 percent. By contrast, in 
the more entrepreneurial provinces such as Guangdong and Zhejiang the 
ratios are much higher (50 percent and 60 percent, respectively). For the 
country as a whole, the ratio is 45 percent. Incidentally, Shanghai’s ratio 
is identical to that of another well-  known statist province in China, Jilin, 
where 16 percent of the household businesses were unregistered.
There is no prima facie reason why Shanghai’s missing entrepreneurship 
is due to a measurement error. Nevertheless, in order to control for any 
potential impact of rural migration on our measure of entrepreneurship, 
we include a variable that can act as a proxy for rural migration (“Rural 
migration”). We derived this measure from a 2002 private-  sector survey, 
which asked about the background of the polled entrepreneurs. On the basis 
of their answers, we coded the entrepreneurs as rural-   or urban-  born and 
calculated the rural-  born entrepreneurs as ratios of all the entrepreneurs. 
The data are at the provincial level. We use this variable as a proxy for rural 
migration. (It should be noted that by this measure there is no evidence that 
Shanghai is particularly open to rural entrepreneurial migrants. About 28 
percent of Shanghai’s entrepreneurs polled in 2002 were from rural areas, 
compared with 42 percent for the country as a whole.) In table 10.1, we 
present the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the regression 
analysis.
6. We thank Randall Morck for making this suggestion.332    Yasheng Huang and Yi Qian
10.1.4    Regression  Results
Table 10.2 reports the regression results on the business density measure 
as our dependent variable. This variable is the number of private ﬁ  rms in a 
city divided by the total population of that city. First, let us note the ﬁ  ndings 
on the provincial- level controls. There is some evidence that rural migration 
does indeed boost entrepreneurship. Rural migration is positively associated 
with a higher level of business density. Trade openness is also positive but 
GDP per capita is negative. The latter result indicates that private-  sector 
development is most substantial in the poorer and marginal regions of the 
country (Huang 2008).
After controlling for these province-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects, a Shanghai city dummy 
has a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on our business density measure. Speciﬁ  cation (1a) 
benchmarks Shanghai against the average number of private ﬁ  rms in all 
other cities. The estimation indicates statistically signiﬁ  cant negative Shang-
Table 10.1  Summary statistics (variables used in the analyses)
Variable   Observation   Mean  
Standard 
deviation
Employment (headcounts) 148,856 346.74 1,879.87
Age (years) 148,856 37.75 210.19
Leverage 144,594 .59 .29
Political hierarchy level of the ﬁ  rm 148,856 55 18
Total assets (10,000 Yuan) 148,856 68,979.17 619,996.3
Sales (10,000 Yuan) 148,856 41,555.31 317,716.4
Rural migration 148,856 37.71 10.74
Trade openness 148,856 28.35 8.41
GDP per capita (Yuan) 148,856 6,708.66 3,900.64
Living expenditures (Yuan) 148,856 6,247.04 1,443.78
Registration type 148,856 152.87 56.83
Average employment size in the private sector 
  divided by that in SOE ﬁ  rms
2,148 1.57 7.65
Average employment size in the private sector 
  divided by that in foreign-  aﬃliated ﬁ  rms
2,148 1.20 3.93
Average number of private ﬁ  rm establishments 
  at the city and industry levels
5,538 2.77 5.57
Average number of private ﬁ  rms as a ratio of 
    the number of SOE ﬁ  rms at the city and 
industry levels   2,261   1.34  2.41
Notes: The political hierarchy level of a ﬁ  rm refers to the level of the bureaucracy to which the 
ﬁ  rm answers. This variable takes on a value of 10 if the ﬁ  rm answers to the central govern-
ment, 20 if to the provincial level; 40 if to the regional level; 50 if to the country level; 61 if to 
the street level; 62 if to the town level; 63 if to the village level; 71 if to the residential associa-
tion level; 72 if to the village association level; and 90 otherwise. The leverage variable is de-
ﬁ  ned as total assets minus shareholder equity and then divided by total assets. Registration 
type identiﬁ  es the ﬁ  rm’s ownership. A SOE is deﬁ  ned by registration type 110; a private ﬁ  rm 
as registration type between 170 and 174; and a foreign-  aﬃliated ﬁ  rm (i.e., a FIE) as registra-
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hai ﬁ  xed eﬀects in relation to the local private-  ﬁ  rm establishments. The 
Shanghai dummy is negative and statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent 
level. This means that the number of private ﬁ  rms in Shanghai is smaller 
than the national average after controlling for all the economic and indus-
try characteristics. Since we examine the number of ﬁ  rms in each industry, 
the data for this set of analyses are aggregated at the city and industry level 
and no ﬁ  rm-  level controls can be included. Speciﬁ  cation (2a) includes all 
other city-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects but omits the Shanghai dummy as the benchmarked 
city. The results are rather striking: there are 136 positive and statistically 
signiﬁ  cant city dummies and 111 negative and statistically signiﬁ  cant city 
dummies. Recall that there are 360 city dummies altogether. Thus, although 
Shanghai is the richest city in China with many favorable endowment fac-
Table 10.2  Density of private ﬁ  rms (number of private ﬁ  rms divided by the city-  level 
population) as the dependent variable
Variables  
(1a) Number of 
private ﬁ  rms/
local population  
(1b) Number of 
private ﬁ  rms/
population  
(2a) Ratio of 
private ﬁ  rms 
to SOEs  
(2b) Ratio of 
private ﬁ  rms 
to SOEs
Substantive variables
Shanghai dummy –.02∗∗∗ Omitted –1.88∗∗∗ Omitted
(.005) (.39)
Number of statistically signiﬁ  cant
  positive city dummies 136 125
Number of statistically signiﬁ  cant 
  negative city dummies 111 35
Provincial-  level economic controls
Rural migration .0004∗∗∗ .0002 .02∗∗∗ –.010
(.0001) (.0001) (.01) (.010)
Trade openness .000∗∗∗ .000∗∗∗ –.000 .000∗∗∗
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
GDP per capita .001 –.011∗∗∗ .63∗∗ –.52∗∗∗
(.003) (.001) (.24) (.13)
Constant .001 .10∗∗∗ –4.84∗∗ 5.61∗∗∗
(.032) (.01) (2.19) (1.14)
Industry controls
Industry dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary statistics
Number of observations 5,460 5,460 2,261 2,261
R2   0.18   0.27   0.21   0.30
Notes: The dependent variable is the density of private ﬁ  rms in a city or their ratio to SOEs. Standard 
errors are clustered at the industry level and generalized least squares (GLS) models are applied. A 
Shanghai dummy is included in regression speciﬁ  cations (1a) and (2a) and is omitted in (1b) and (2b). 
Provincial economic characteristics, ﬁ  rm-  level attributes, and industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects are controlled for.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.334    Yasheng Huang and Yi Qian
tors, it has underperformed against a large number of other cities in China. 
Many of these cities have a fraction of Shanghai’s GDP per capita.
We further reﬁ  ned our measure by devising a more explicit measure of 
entrepreneurial business density. We benchmarked private ﬁ  rms against the 
SOEs and FIEs—the established incumbent businesses in our data set—by 
generating two ratios: the number of private ﬁ  rms in a city divided by the 
average number of SOEs in the city and the number of private ﬁ  rms in a 
city divided by the number of FIEs in the city. To be as accurate and as ﬁ  ne-
  tuned as possible, we calculated these two ratios for each city and industry 
for 1998. We repeated the regression analyses on these two alternative depen-
dent variables of private ﬁ  rm numbers in ratio to SOEs and FIEs. The results 
are robust across the two alternative ratio dependent variables. To preserve 
space, we only report the results of the ratios between private ﬁ  rm establish-
ments and SOEs (columns [2a] and [2b] in table 10.2). We highlight that by 
this measure Shanghai outperformed thirty-  ﬁ  ve other cities in China and 
underperformed 125 other cities. It is not statistically distinguishable from 
an additional 200 cities. The ﬁ  nding is certainly at a huge variance with the 
impression often conveyed by Western scholars that Shanghai is “the head 
of the dragon” (Guthrie 1999).
We report the ﬁ  ndings based on the second measure of entrepreneurship 
in our chapter—size of ﬁ  rm employment—in table 10.3. The log value of 
ﬁ  rm employment is the dependent variable. The provincial-  level economic 
controls and industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects are identical to those used in table 10.1 
and table 10.2. Speciﬁ  cation (1a) shows a negative coeﬃcient for the Shang-
hai dummy, statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level, illustrating that 
the private ﬁ  rms in Shanghai are smaller than the national average of all 
cities. We then omitted the Shanghai dummy to set it as a benchmark for 
comparison and included all the other city dummies. The number of cities 
that have statistically signiﬁ  cant larger private ﬁ  rms than Shanghai (238) is 
almost six times the number of cities that have statistically signiﬁ  cant smaller 
private ﬁ  rms (forty-  ﬁ  ve), as displayed in column (2b) of table 10.3. Recall 
again that there is a total of 360 cities in the sample.
We then generated the ratio variables to capture the relative employment 
size of private ﬁ  rms to SOEs in each city and in each industry. We used this 
employment ratio as an alternative dependent variable in speciﬁ  cations (2a) 
and (2b) in table 10.3. Since these data are generated at the city and industry 
levels, ﬁ  rm-  level characteristics are not included in the regression runs. The 
results show that private ﬁ  rm size relative to local SOEs in the same sector in 
Shanghai is smaller than that in 150 other cities, as indicated by the fact that 
150 other cities carry statistically signiﬁ  cant and positive coeﬃcients. The 
debt/  equity ratio of a private ﬁ  rm is signiﬁ  cantly and positively associated 
with ﬁ  rm employment size, and private ﬁ  rms that answer to province or local 
governments tend to have a larger employment size than those that answer 
to the central government, as demonstrated by the positive and signiﬁ  cant 






(2a) Ratio of 
private to SOE 
employment  
(2b) Ratio of 
private to SOE 
employment
Substantive variables
Shanghai dummy –1.67∗∗∗ –.84
(.65) (.87)
Number of statistically signiﬁ  cant 
  positive city dummies
238 150
Number of statistically signiﬁ  cant 
  negative city dummies
 45 117
Provincial-  level economic controls
Rural migration .041∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ –.014 –.28∗∗∗
(.005) (0.01) (.013) (.03)
Trade openness .002∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗ –.002 –.0003∗∗∗
(.000) (.0001) (.001) (.0001)
GDP per capita .66∗∗∗ –.13∗ –.193 –4.25∗∗∗
(.21) (.08) (.435) (.47)
Firm- level  controls
Age of ﬁ  rms .000 –.0002
(.000) (.0001)
Debt/asset ratio .64∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗
(.09) (.05)
Political hierarchy 1.77∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗
  Provincial  level (.45) (.30)
  Regional  level 1.34∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗
(.25) (.15)
  County-  level 1.28∗∗∗ .85∗∗∗
(.16) (.14)
  Street-  level 1.03∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗
(.19) (.15)
  Town  level 1.25∗∗∗ .75∗∗∗
(.14) (.13)
  Village  level 1.18∗∗∗ .70∗∗
(.14) (.25)
  Residential-  association  level .51∗∗ .35
(.20) (.28)
  Village-  association  level .86∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗
(.12) (.12)
Constant 7.16∗∗∗ –9.25∗∗∗ 4.54∗∗∗ 50.67∗∗∗
(1.36) (.60) (.92) (4.91)
Industry controls
  Industry  dummies  included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary statistics
  Number  of  observations 10,139 10,139 2,148 2,148
  R2   0.32   0.63   0.44   0.62
Notes: The dependent variable is the log number of employees per private ﬁ  rm or their ratios to SOE 
employment. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and GLS models are applied. A Shanghai 
dummy is included in regression speciﬁ  cations (1a) and (2a) and is omitted in (1b) and (2b). Provincial 
economic characteristics, ﬁ  rm-  level attributes, and industry-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects are controlled for.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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To check the robustness of the results, in addition to the two traditional 
proxies reported previously, we used additional proxies for entrepreneurship. 
In particular, we generated log of sales and total assets of the private ﬁ  rms 
to serve as alternative dependent variables. Table 10.4 reports the ﬁ  ndings 
based on these two measures. Again, there are overwhelmingly more cities 
where private ﬁ  rms have statistically larger sales and asset levels than Shang-
hai. This is clearly indicated by the 163 positive and signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients 
on the other city dummies and the forty-  ﬁ  ve signiﬁ  cantly negative city co-
eﬃcients in the sales speciﬁ  cation (column [1b] in table 10.4), and by the 343 
signiﬁ  cantly positive city coeﬃcients and the only two signiﬁ  cantly negative 
city coeﬃcients in the total assets speciﬁ  cation (column [2b] in table 10.4).
In addition, we also carried out regression analysis using diﬀerent deﬁ  -
nitions of private ﬁ  rms. This is necessary in part because the registration 
status of a ﬁ  rm may not accurately reﬂ  ect its true shareholding arrange-
ment. For example, an SOE can be privatized but its registration status may 
still remain as an SOE. We thus used the information on the shareholding 
structure in the CIC and devised diﬀerent thresholds for private ﬁ  rms. We 
deﬁ  ne a private ﬁ  rm alternately as one with 30 percent, 50 percent, or 80 
percent private shareholding. The regression results are largely unaﬀected. 
The only change is that Shanghai tends to have bigger ﬁ  rms as measured 
in terms of assets when the private investors are minority shareholders; that 
is, when the private equity share is 30 percent.7 The most likely reason for 
this is that Shanghai has more publicly- listed ﬁ  rms than other cities and the 
vast majority of publicly-  listed ﬁ  rms in China have only 30 percent of their 
shares freely tradable on the stock market. The remainder of the shares are 
held by government agencies or state-  owned institutions.
10.2      Why Entrepreneurship is Lagging in Shanghai: A Hypothesis
In the previous section, we showed that entrepreneurship in Shanghai 
is underdeveloped relative to that in other cities in China. This is so even 
though the city has some substantial historical and economic advantages 
that normally would be propitious for entrepreneurial growth. In this sec-
tion, we oﬀer a conjecture that the “missing entrepreneurship” phenomenon 
is related to policy, speciﬁ  cally industrial policy. The gist of industrial policy 
is to favor large and incumbent ﬁ  rms and to promote ﬁ  rms in the high-  tech 
industries. The vast majority of the entrepreneurial businesses in China are 
low-  tech, and by deﬁ  nition, small. It is in this sense that industrial policy 
undermines entrepreneurship.
Our account here is descriptive and narrative. It is a conjecture rather 
than a direct empirical demonstration of the suppressive eﬀect of industrial 
policy. As will be detailed later in this section, the industrial policy model 
was established in the late 1980s, well beyond the coverage of our data set. 
7. The results are available from the authors upon request.Table 10.4  Alternative dependent variables: Log sales and log assets
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Variables   Log sales   Log sales   Log assets   Log assets
Substantive variables
Shanghai dummy –.14 –.38∗
(.16) (.21)
Number of statistically signiﬁ  cant
  positive city dummies 163 343
Number of statistically signiﬁ  cant 
  negative city dummies 45 2
Provincial-  level economic controls
Rural migration –.002 –0.12∗∗∗ –.007∗∗∗ –0.10∗∗∗
(.002) (0.004) (.002) (0.004)
Trade openness .0001 –.001∗∗∗ –.0001 –.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
GDP per capita .23∗∗ .66∗∗∗ –.23∗∗ –.53∗∗∗
(.11) (.12) (.10) (.09)
Firm- level  controls
Age of ﬁ  rms .000 –.000 .000 .0007
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.0007)
Debt/asset ratio .14∗∗∗ –.42∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗
(.05) (.07) (.06) (0.057)
Political hierarchy –.33 .03 1.58∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗
  Provincial  level (.40) (.42) (.36) (0.34)
  Regional  level .34∗∗∗ .15 1.70∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
(.15) (.15) (.20) (0.20)
  County-  level .10 –.01 1.27∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
(.15) (.16) (.19) (0.19)
  Street-  level .19 –.04 .71∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗
(.17) (.17) (.21) (0.21)
  Town  level .18 –.06 .88∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(.13) (.13) (.18) (0.18)
  Village  level .26∗∗ .09 .84∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
(.13) (.13) (.17) (0.18)
  Residential-  association  level .14 –.04 .74∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗
(.17) (.19) (.24) (0.24)
  Village-  association  level .14 .03 .65∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(.12) (.12) (.17) (0.17)
Constant 7.08∗∗∗ 7.71∗∗∗ 8.97∗∗∗ 9.97∗∗∗
(.69) (.64) (.63) (.80)
Industry controls
Industry dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary statistics
Number of observations 10,139 10,139 10,139 10,139
R2   .20   .22   .21   .29
Notes: The dependent variables are log sales and log assets. Standard errors are clustered at 
the industry level and GLS models are applied. A Shanghai dummy is included in regression 
speciﬁ  cations (1a) and (2a) and is omitted in (1b) and (2b). Provincial economic characteris-
tics, ﬁ  rm-  level attributes, and industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects are controlled for.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.338    Yasheng Huang and Yi Qian
This makes it diﬃcult to perform a “before-  after” analysis of the eﬀect of 
the introduction of industrial policy on entrepreneurship. Our approach is 
to document the historical rise of the industrial policy model in Shanghai 
and to argue that this account is descriptively consistent with the statistical 
results presented in the previous section.
10.2.1      The Rise of the Industrial Policy Model in Shanghai
The rise of the industrial policy model in Shanghai closely coincided with 
the political fortunes of two Chinese leaders—Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. 
Jiang became mayor of Shanghai in 1985 and party secretary in 1987. Zhu 
replaced Jiang as mayor in 1987 and as party secretary in 1989. (All Chinese 
government agencies are headed by two individuals, the party secretary and 
the administrative leader.) Both of these leaders are regarded as consum-
mate technocrats, having been trained as engineers and having spent long 
periods of their careers in technology before moving to Shanghai. Jiang 
had been minister of the electronics industry and Zhu had worked in the 
State Economic Commission, the agency in charge of upgrading China’s 
technology base.
There is another signiﬁ  cant implication associated with these two lead-
ers—they were both national leaders from 1989 to 2002. Jiang Zemin was 
promoted to general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 1989 
and Zhu Rongji was promoted to executive vice premier in 1991, governor 
of China’s central bank in 1993, and premier in 1998. In other words, these 
two individuals, who staﬀed the central government heavily with technocrats 
from Shanghai, fundamentally shaped China’s economic policy direction in 
the 1990s. Huang (2008) presents evidence that under Jiang and Zhu, China 
in the 1990s substantially moved toward a commanding-  heights style of 
economic development.
We have documentary and some statistical evidence showing that rule 
by Jiang and Zhu in the second half of the 1980s coincided with economic 
centralization in Shanghai and preceded a huge contraction of ﬁ  xed-  asset 
investments by the private sector. A policy milestone in Shanghai’s develop-
ment is the 1987 government document, “A comprehensive development 
program for Shanghai” (Yatsko 2004). The program laid out many of the key 
elements of Shanghai’s aspirations to transform itself into a world- class city 
in short order. The document does not include speciﬁ  c details about what 
would become the famous Shanghai landmarks of the 1990s, such as the 
Pudong district, the Maglev train, and so forth. But it sets forth the rationale 
that came to justify these highly costly projects—Shanghai was to join the 
ranks of global, world-  class cities by the early twenty-  ﬁ  rst century. Consid-
ering that in 1987 Shanghai had a per capita GDP of less than US$800, this 
was an extraordinarily ambitious goal.
The 1987 development program established two key mechanisms to leap-
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advanced technology and global brands. The other was a systematic push 
to eliminate all vestiges of those extant features of the city considered to 
be backward by the policy elites. These included the ubiquitous small and 
informal market activities in urban China in the 1980s—food and vegetable 
stalls operated by peasants at the intersections of cities and the countryside. 
In the ﬁ  rst half of the 1980s, many spontaneous marketplaces had sprung 
up in various neighborhoods in central Shanghai, hawking goods ranging 
from vegetables, eggs, and even small-  scale industrial goods.
The 1987 development program established a bureaucratic mechanism 
to systematically cleanse Shanghai of these backward vestiges—a super-
  municipal agency headed by the Shanghai mayor himself. The agency cen-
tralized all urban planning decisions. The Pudong project, which was to 
rapidly convert an area of 350 square kilometers of farmland into a ﬁ  nancial 
and commercial center, was ﬁ  rst conceived by this agency. The essence of 
the Pudong model is deceptively simple. The government, as the monopoly 
buyer facing no competition, was to requisition vast tracts of land from rural 
households at below-  market prices and then auction oﬀ the land-  use rights 
at prevailing market prices. The proceeds from the land sales would then be 
used to ﬁ  nance the government’s industrial-  policy programs, welfare and 
pension obligations, and, last but not least, corruption.
We have some evidence that the 1987 development program had an 
immediate eﬀect on entrepreneurship in Shanghai. One reliable indicator of 
private- sector development is the share of capital for ﬁ  xed asset investments 
by the private sector. Figure 10.1 presents the percentage shares of capital 
Fig. 10.1    Fixed-  asset investments by the individual economy in Shanghai, 1978–
  2004 (Percentage share of individual economy to total ﬁ  xed asset investments, 
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for ﬁ  xed asset investments by what is known as the “individual economy” 
in Chinese statistical parlance—equivalent to single proprietorships or self-
  employers in the West. In the 1980s and up to the mid-  1990s, individual 
economy units comprised the absolute majority of the indigenous private 
sector in China.
The patterns are striking. In the ﬁ  rst half of the 1980s, Shanghai was 
liberalizing. The ﬁ  xed asset share of the individual economy rose from 3.2 
percent in 1978 to 10 percent in 1985, with 1985 marking the peak of private-
 sector development in Shanghai. The turning point seems to be around 1986, 
the ﬁ  rst year of Jiang Zemin’s rule. The ratio declined sharply to 7 percent 
in 1986, then to 5.8 percent in 1991, and to only 1.1 percent in 1993. Over 
the next ten years this ratio further steadily declined from an already neg-
ligible level in 1993. In 2004, the share was 0.2 percent, less than one-  tenth 
the level in 1978.
We should highlight that the policy environment in Shanghai discouraged 
investment by both the small mom- and- pop businesses represented in ﬁ  gure 
10.1 and the larger private-  sector ﬁ  rms covered by the CIC. This ﬁ  nding 
helps us diﬀerentiate between two competing explanations for the policy 
reversals in Shanghai. One is that the reversal was entirely exogenous—
that it coincided with the appointment of two consummate technocrats as 
Shanghai leaders in the second half of the 1980s. This is our candidate 
explanation.
The other explanation identiﬁ  es an endogenous cause. This is the explana-
tion oﬀered by Rajan and Zingales (2003) as to why many countries choose 
to reverse ﬁ  nancial liberalization policies.8 There are important analytical 
as well as empirical reasons to sort out the true causal mechanisms here. 
The incumbent-  power argument would lead one to believe that the entre-
preneurial atrophy observed during the 1998 to 2001 period was a result of 
Shanghai’s early success, whereas our own candidate explanation would 
argue that Shanghai early on chose a developmental model that entailed 
important path-  dependency dynamics many years down the road. There is 
also the issue of whether we can be conﬁ  dent of our policy- related explana-
tion, rather than an explanation that views the policy reversals as an endog-
enous outcome of earlier entrepreneurial successes.
Data in ﬁ  gure 10.1 help us rule out the endogenous explanation. The pol-
icy reversal occurred in Shanghai when the private sector was substantially 
underdeveloped vis-  à-  vis the rest of the country (a situation that persisted 
into the 1998 to 2001 period, as we saw earlier). At its peak, the individual 
economy accounted for 10 percent of total ﬁ  xed assets in Shanghai, whereas 
during the early 1980s the ratio was more than 20 percent for China as a 
whole. Shanghai reversed its private-  sector policies when its private sector 
was very weak, not when it was strong.
8. We thank Antoinette Schoar for pointing out the potential link between our chapter and 
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10.2.2      The Visible Hand of the State
The ﬂ  ip side of entrepreneurial development is a highly interventionist 
and visible hand of the state. In this part of the chapter, we document some 
of the regulatory and policy practices in Shanghai that may explain why 
entrepreneurship is missing in Shanghai. Our description here—based on 
relatively systematic survey evidence and some interview data—is again at a 
sharp variance with the widespread view in the West that Shanghai has the 
most developed market economy in China.
An example of research that shows Shanghai to have strong property 
rights protection is Fan et al. (2007),9 where property rights protection is 
based on “the suit frequency and court eﬃciency.” We will note that this 
measure contains both some ambiguities and some empirical anomalies. 
First, the measure does not distinguish between state property rights and 
private property rights. In an economy in which state property rights are 
given automatic precedence over private property rights, we believe that 
when measuring property rights protection it is highly signiﬁ  cant to distin-
guish between state property rights and private property rights.
It is quite possible that this deﬁ  nitional ambiguity may have led to a num-
ber of empirical anomalies in Fan et al. (2007). For example, by their mea-
sure, the two bastions of SOEs, Jilin and Liaoning, have the same score as 
the two pioneering, reform-  oriented, and market-  conforming provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian. Also, by their measure, Jiangsu is ranked as having 
stronger property rights protection than Zhejiang. This ranking is rather 
inconsistent with some basic facts about China. Zhejiang is known to be 
among the most entrepreneurial and capitalistic provinces in China, whereas 
Jiangsu was known—at least until the late 1990s—to be interventionist 
and state-  controlled. Zhejiang is associated with the laissez-  faire Wenzhou 
model that permits substantial informal credit to the private sector; Jiangsu 
is associated with the Sunan model that promotes collective TVEs and 
restricts private enterprises.
We present an alternative ranking of Chinese cities. Our evidence comes 
from a 2005 World Bank survey of over 120 Chinese cities. Research from 
this survey appears in China Governance, Investment Climate, and Harmoni-
ous Society: Competitiveness Enhancements for 120 Cities in China (World 
Bank 2006). The report awards Shanghai a silver medal in its overall assess-
ment of investment climate (World Bank 2006, 46–  47). The World Bank 
survey has three main components: (a) city characteristics; (b) government 
eﬀectiveness; and (c) social measures of environmental quality, health, and 
education. Shanghai ranks very high in a composite ranking of these three 
components. Shanghai is number six in investment climate for domestic 
ﬁ  rms and number seventeen in investment climate for foreign ﬁ  rms.
Upon closer inspection of the data, it is clear that Shanghai scores high 
9. We thank Professor Randall Morck for bringing our attention to this paper.342    Yasheng Huang and Yi Qian
in stock conditions. Of the three components in the World Bank survey, 
two—city characteristics and social measures—are strongly inﬂ  uenced by 
history and by policy treatments of the central government. It is not surpris-
ing that Shanghai would score very high on these two measures. Its excellent 
geographic position is augmented by massive investments by the central 
government in its port facilities. It also boasts a high level of human capital 
and the nation’s best hospitals and educational institutions.
Only the measure of government eﬀectiveness truly reﬂ  ects the portion of 
the investment climate that is subject to the discretionary inﬂ  uences of local 
governments. This measure is based on a range of indicators, such as taxes, 
bureaucratic red- tape, and an indicator that is widely found to be closely cor-
related with corruption—time spent with government oﬃcials. The ﬁ  ndings 
on government eﬀectiveness are much more meaningful in terms of both 
analytical and policy implications. There is very little a Chinese city located 
in an interior region can do about its geographical isolation, but it can 
improve its competitive position by strengthening its policy eﬀectiveness.
On its measure of government eﬀectiveness, Shanghai has a remarkably 
low score, ranking number seventy-  seven in the country as perceived by 
domestic ﬁ  rms (in comparison with number six in its overall investment 
ranking). The ranking improved substantially in the perception by foreign 
ﬁ  rms, where it ranked number twenty- six nationwide. In other words, Shang-
hai is ranked at the bottom third of Chinese cities by domestic ﬁ  rms while 
it is ranked in the top third of Chinese cities by foreign ﬁ  rms.
Interviews by one of the authors of this chapter with entrepreneurs in 
Shanghai reveal a portrayal of the business environment in Shanghai that is 
consistent with the World Bank rankings of Chinese cities. These interviews 
uncovered a range of restrictive policies toward household businesses.10 
These restrictions only began to ease in 2005. A summary of some of these 
policy restrictions includes:
1.  The Shanghai government imposed onerous restrictions on who could 
start a second job as a private entrepreneur. University professors, civil ser-
vants, SOE general managers, and workers for nonproﬁ  t organizations were 
not allowed to start private businesses on the side. They had to quit their 
current jobs, the eﬀect of which was that they lost the risk insurance that 
comes with a regular job, an insurance that was necessary at the beginning 
of the reforms. After 2005, this restriction only applied to civil servants.
2. The government imposed a registration capital requirement and 
required entrepreneurs to register the entire amount of the capital require-
10. The interviews, in October 2007 by Yasheng Huang, were conducted with entrepreneurs, 
lawyers who specialize in registration regulations, and oﬃcials at the All-  China Federation of 
Industry and Commerce, an organization representing private-  sector businesses. In addition, 
Huang visited several district oﬃces of the Shanghai Bureau of Industry and Commerce, the 
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ment on the day of registration. Thus, a potential entrepreneur would have 
to show proof of the requisite capital rather than being able to pay the 
registered capital in installments.
3. Shanghai has very strict zoning regulations. Residential apartments 
cannot be used for commercial purposes and renting residential space on 
a commercial lease must be approved by the government. Government 
enforcement has become progressively more strict. One eﬀect of this is that 
it has raised the business and rental costs for household entrepreneurs.
4.  The Shanghai government tightly controls land transactions. A con-
crete indicator is that all the demolition businesses—a huge business now 
as the city is demolishing many old buildings to build new structures—are 
completely state-  owned. This shows the intention of the Shanghai govern-
ment to strongly control land allocations.
5.  The Shanghai government explicitly forbids private-  sector ﬁ  rms from 
bidding for critical infrastructure projects. Since much of the GDP growth 
in Shanghai in the 1990s was generated by these investment projects, private-
 sector  ﬁ  rms missed out on one of the key growth areas of the economy.
6.  The Shanghai government favors FIEs (ﬁ  rms with at least 25 percent 
of foreign equity) both explicitly and implicitly. One implicit form of policy 
favoritism is that the Shanghai government allows FIEs to deduct actual 
labor costs from their tax liabilities. Domestic ﬁ  rms are allowed to deduct 
labor costs only to the extent of an average level speciﬁ  ed by the government. 
The government also purposely set the level of salaries for domestic ﬁ  rms 
lower than the market rate, thus limiting the deductions by domestic ﬁ  rms.
7.  As compared with other transition economies, the World Bank does 
not classify China as having onerous business licensing procedures. The 
length of time to start a business is about forty days, and to register a new 
business, thirty days. This is substantially better than Vietnam, where it may 
take six months to set up a business (McMillan and Woodruﬀ 2002). The 
World Bank’s reporting is based on China’s business licensing regulations. 
A close reading of these regulations and other accompanying documents at 
several business licensing oﬃces in Shanghai reveals a misreading of these 
classiﬁ  cations. The thirty-  day length refers to the amount of time required 
by the licensing oﬃce to notify an applicant whether his application for 
license has been approved. However, before the business is eligible to apply 
for a license, it needs to provide documentation from numerous govern-
ment agencies. For example, if an entrepreneur intends to set up a stall in a 
particular location, she has to obtain a permit from the agency in charge of 
that location. She also has to obtain certiﬁ  cates from the health and labor 
bureaus. If she cannot provide a business address that is separate from her 
home address, she must provide documentation that her home has been 
certiﬁ  ed for dual residential and business usage.
8.  The licensing oﬃce accepts applications for business licenses only after 
all these documentation requirements are satisﬁ  ed. A number of entrepre-344    Yasheng Huang and Yi Qian
neurs commented that although these documentation requirements are uni-
form across China, they are enforced more vigorously in Shanghai, meaning 
that the documentation must be complete in Shanghai, whereas in other 
regions of the country the licensing agencies do not insist on complete docu-
mentation.
10.3    Conclusion
A widespread view among economists is that China has adopted a par-
ticularly innovative and welfare-  enhancing blend of reform policies that 
delayed the privatization of SOEs while solving eﬃciency and social prob-
lems via encouraging new entry (Roland 2000; Rodrik 2007). Shanghai 
seems to have done exactly the opposite—it has aggressively restructured 
SOEs at a staggering social cost, while it has restricted entry. The density of 
private business in Shanghai is well below the national average even as its 
unemployment is among the highest in the country.
The story of Shanghai is one of two extremes. At one extreme, Shanghai 
is viewed as a model of economic development and as a symbol of a rising 
and prosperous China. At the other extreme, as we have shown, Shanghai 
appears to lack private- sector entrepreneurship—a microeconomic mecha-
nism widely regarded as important for economic growth, competition, job 
creation, and innovation. Despite wide adulation of the city, few analysts 
have undertaken serious data analysis. To our knowledge, this chapter is the 
ﬁ  rst systematic eﬀort to examine this important microeconomic mechanism 
of growth in Shanghai.
The ﬁ  ndings are at substantial variance with the common view of Western 
observers that Shanghai has the most developed market economy in China. 
We ﬁ nd that by controlling for a variety of industry and province ﬁ  xed eﬀects 
and ﬁ  rm- level dynamics, entrepreneurial businesses in Shanghai lagged sub-
stantially behind entrepreneurial businesses in other Chinese cities. This is 
the case despite the fact that historically Shanghai has been very entrepre-
neurial and it possesses propitious endowment factors that would normally 
be associated with a ﬂ  ourishing of entrepreneurship. We oﬀer the conjecture 
that the strong push to an industrial policy model of economic development 
by Shanghai leaders since the second half of the 1980s is the reason for the 
missing-  entrepreneurship phenomenon in Shanghai.
This chapter has implications both for Shanghai and for China as a whole. 
The “tyranny of numbers,” in the words of Alywn Young (1995), leads us to 
cast substantial doubt on the economic foundation of Shanghai. It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to deal with this issue here, but one hypothesis 
(oﬀered by Huang [2008]) is that GDP grew very fast in Shanghai in the 
1990s because Shanghai, on account of its political privileges, was mas-
sively subsidized by the rest of the country. Another hypothesis, oﬀered by 
Huang (2008), is that Shanghai’s anti-  entrepreneurial growth model, while Is Entrepreneurship Missing in Shanghai?    3 4 5
allowing for rapid GDP growth, did relatively little to improve the welfare 
of the average residents in Shanghai. Evidence to support the latter hypoth-
esis is already available. In the 1990s, although Shanghai’s GDP per capita 
increased to ﬁ  vefold the national means, its household income per capita 
relative to the nation as a whole changed very little. More research is needed 
to investigate the connections between the missing-  entrepreneurship phe-
nomenon documented in this chapter and the seemingly stagnant household 
income growth in Shanghai.
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